Cybaris®
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 4

2014

The Republic of Korea's Trend of Invalidating Pharmaceutical
Patents: Can U.S. Pharmaceutical Companies Prevail at the
Korean Supreme Court?
Jae Hun Kim

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris

Recommended Citation
Kim, Jae Hun (2014) "The Republic of Korea's Trend of Invalidating Pharmaceutical Patents: Can U.S.
Pharmaceutical Companies Prevail at the Korean Supreme Court?," Cybaris®: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cybaris® by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S TREND OF INVALIDATING
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: CAN U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES PREVAIL AT THE KOREAN SUPREME COURT?
JAE HUN KIM†
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................478
II. SELECTION INVENTION .............................................................479
A. Novelty ............................................................................480
B. Inventiveness ..................................................................481
C. Disclosure Requirement .................................................483
III.

PATENTABILITY STANDARD OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS ...........................................................................484
A. Sanofi Patent ..................................................................486
1. Scientific Background ................................................486
2. Procedural Background ..............................................488
3. Significance ................................................................492

IV. POST-SANOFI DECISIONS .........................................................494
A. Warner-Lambert Co. Patent ...........................................494
B. Eli Lilly ...........................................................................495
V. WHY SO STRICT? .....................................................................495
A. Legal Explanation ..........................................................496
†

Jae Hun Kim is a J.D. Candidate 2014, William Mitchell College of Law;
B.S. Mechnical Engineering, University of Iowa, 2011. The author would like to
thank Jeena Lee for providing valuable knowledge regarding fundamentals of
pharmaceuticals and a prospective pharmacist’s perspective to this article. Jeena
Lee is a PharmD candidate at the University of Minnesota College of Pharmacy.
The author also would like to dedicate this article to his parents, Su Kyum
Kim and Hae Hwa Shin, for their supports and inspirations to the author. Lastly,
the author would like to thank God for granting me His wisdom. I would not
have been able to do this if not for Him.

476

[5:476 2014]

KOREAN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS

477

1. Heightened Novelty Standard ....................................496
2. Heightened Inventiveness Standard ...........................500
B. Protectionism?................................................................504
1. Rationales of the Korean Patent Act ..........................504
VI. CONCLUSION...........................................................................511

[5:476 2014]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

478

I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Korea (Korea) 1 modified the Korean Patent
Act in 1986 to allow pharmaceutical products as patentable subject
matter. Since then, the size of the Korean pharmaceutical market,2
its potential growth rate,3 and the increasing amount of interstate
trade between Korea and United States4 has made it attractive for
U.S. pharmaceutical companies. U.S. pharmaceutical companies
could realize substantial profits from the international trade.5
However, approaching the Korean pharmaceutical market has
become more demanding than before because profit may increase
or decrease depending on what strategies a company takes. Among
such strategies is obtaining patent protection over high-value
pharmaceuticals to prevent competition from generic drugs.

1

The Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea, will be
referred to as Korea. The contents of this paper have no relevance to North
Korea, which is officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
2
See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. NO.
3949,U.S.–KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: POTENTIAL ECONOMY-WIDE AND
SELECTED SECTORAL EFFECTS, INV. NO. TA-2104-24, 64 (Sept. 2007)
(Corrected) [hereinafter USITC] (“Korea's pharmaceutical market is ranked
among the world's top 12 pharmaceutical markets and is worth approximately $8
billion annually.”).
3
See id. (“Sustained growth in the market is expected as the Korean
population ages.”).
4
See Yong-Shik Lee et al., The United States - Korea Free Trade
Agreement: Path to Common Economic Prosperity or False Promise?, 6 E.
ASIA L. REV. 111, 113 (2011) (“The historic U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement
(FTA), which is the largest FTA since the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the first FTA between major trading nations in North
America and Asia, was agreed upon on April 2, 2007 after 14 months of
negotiations, and signed on June 30, 2007.”).
5
See USITC, supra note 2 (“U.S. exports of pharmaceutical products to
Korea were valued at $351 million in 2006. In that year, the United States
accounted for 15.8% of Korea's imports of pharmaceutical products.”).
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This article is intended to help U.S. practitioners in building
their own legal strategies. Part I of this article will discuss the
invalidation of Korean pharmaceutical patents based on decisions
from the Korean Supreme Court. Knowing such trends will
provide practitioners (1) an opportunity to approach Korean
pharmaceutical industry more efficiently and (2) an idea of what to
expect in near future.
Part II of this article will discuss the general definition and
legal standard of “selection invention,” which is a class of
inventions where a known molecule may, in certain circumstances,
satisfy the inventive step requirement under Korean patent law.6
Part III of this article will introduce the Korean Supreme Court’s
decisions as to selection invention, which have been consistently
strict against patent holders. 7 Finally, Part IV of this article will
provide a legal explanation and policy justifications for such a
strict patentability standard with respect to selection invention.8
II. SELECTION INVENTION
A primary purpose and effect of “selection invention” or
“selective invention” is to grant a patent right over species when
all or part of its genus are known to the public or disclosed in the
prior art.9 The official Korean jurisdiction uses nomenclatures of
6

See infra Part II; see also Patrick P. Hansen & Donald J. Featherstone, A
Brief Review of U.S. and Korean Patent Invalidity Decisions for CMP Slurry
Patents, 8 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 85, 89 (2011) (“In Korea, selection
inventions are becoming very important in the pharmaceutical field, as many
new drugs are based on improvements to known molecules and compounds.”)
7
See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See Jay A. Erstling & Ryan E. Strom, Korea's Patent Policy and Its
Impact on Economic Development: A Model for Emerging Countries?, 11 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 441, 452 (2010); see also Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.) (“The so-called selective invention means
an invention which states the element of the preceding or already publicized
invention as its superordinate concept and whose elements entirely or partly
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“superordinate concept” and “subordinate concept,” 10 which
corresponds respectively to “genus” and “species.” Hereinafter,
due to reader’s familiarity, the article will consistently use
nomenclatures of genus and species.
A. Novelty
The Korean Patent Act does not explicitly define “novelty”11;
however, article 29 defines “prior art” and states that an invention
may be patentable unless it is anticipated by the prior art. 12
Generally, in selection invention, novelty is destroyed when a prior
art reference discloses a chemical composition that is the subject
matter of an invention. The Korean Supreme Court has held that a
prior art reference also discloses the composition when the
composition is such that it would have been “recognizable” at the
time of the filing date to a person having ordinary skill in the art.13
Therefore, the destruction of novelty may also occur when the
prior art discloses a structurally similar chemical compound to the
subject matter of a claimed invention.

consist of subordinate concepts derived from the above superordinate
concept.”).
10
Translated authority provided by Korean Intellectual Property Office uses
subordinate concept and superordinate concept in defining selection invention.
The subordinate–superordinate relationship corresponds to the genus-species
relationship. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.).
11
Erstling, supra note 9, at 450.
12
Id. at 471 n.163; see also Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec.
31, 1961, art. 29.1-.2 (S. Kor.) (“Inventions having industrial applicability may
be patentable unless they fall under any of the following subparagraphs: 1.
Inventions publicly known or worked in the Republic of Korea or in a foreign
country prior to the filing of the patent application; 2. Inventions described in a
publication distributed in the Republic of Korea or in a foreign country prior to
the filing of the patent application or inventions made accessible to the public
through telecommunication lines prescribed by Presidential Decree.”).
13
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.).
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Korean courts have been consistently hostile toward patentees
in applying this novelty standard.14 This is especially true when the
claimed composition is structurally similar to the prior art. 15
Currently, a prior art reference disclosing a certain molecule16 will
likely destroy the novelty of a mirror-image molecule17 or its salt,18
regardless of substantive differences in chemical properties
between the two molecules.19
B. Inventiveness
“Inventive step” or “inventiveness” is analogous to the concept
of non-obviousness in U.S. patent law.20 Article 29.2 of the Korean
Patent Act provides that an invention is not patentable when a
person having ordinary skill in the art could easily have made the
14

See Hansen & Featherstone, supra note 6, at 89 (“Similarly, Korean
patentees have faced hurdles such as high standards for patentability. For
example, the Korean Supreme Court decision in Sanofi-Aventis v. CJ set forth
extremely strict standards for the patentability of selection inventions.”).
15
The Korean courts have generally rejected patentability or invalidated the
patent of a chemical composition that is structurally similar to that of the prior
art. See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
16
See infra Part. III.A.1.i.
17
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.)
(holding that disclosing a chemical equation of heptanoic acid enantiomer in its
embodiment destroys patentability of an invention of which heptanoic acid
enantiomer is a subject since a person having ordinary skill in the art will easily
recognize the existence of heptanoic acid enantiomer).
18
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.) (denying a patentability of an enantiomer as the hydrochloride salt
when the prior art discloses racemate as the hydrochloride salt).
19
Merely disclosing the chemical equation of a composition in the
specification may destroy the novelty of an invention of which the composition
is a subject matter. See id. (“It is not necessary that the comparison invention
No. 1 disclose the method of separation or the possibility of separation as
alleged in the plaintiff’s ground of appeal.”).
20
Erstling, supra note 9, at 451.
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invention prior to the filing of the patent application.21 In selection
invention, an invention will be considered to possess inventiveness
if there is either “qualitative” or “conspicuously quantitative
difference” in effect between the prior art and the invention. 22
Some commentators refer to a “conspicuous quantitative
difference” as “superior working effect over the prior art.”23
“Qualitative difference” refers to differences between the
medicinal purpose of the invention and that of the prior art. 24
Therefore, there is no “qualitative difference” if there are
significant similarities between a medicinal purpose of the claimed
composition and that of the prior art. 25 However, a claimed
composition, which is qualitatively similar to a prior art, still
possesses inventiveness if its working effect is superior over that of
the prior art. 26 The Korean Supreme Court has set a very high
21

Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 29.2 (S.

Kor.).
22

See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.)
(“[S]ubordinate concepts possess either effects different in quality from the
preceding invention, or there exist conspicuous differences in effect as measured
quantitatively between them.”).
23
The biggest law firm in Korea, Kim and Chang, uses “superior working
effect” to describe invention’s qualitative difference over the prior art. See
generally Jay Young-June Yang, Jay J. Kim & Mee Sung Shim, The Korean
Supreme Court Applies Strict Patentability Standards Against Selection
Inventions, KIM & CHANG QUARTERLY UPDATE OF KOREAN IP LAW & POLICY,
Mar. 25, 2010, at 1-3, available at http://www.ip.kimchang.com/ip/
frame2.jsp?lang=2&b_id=113&m_id=161.
24
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.); see
also Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.) (discussing "differences in quality").
25
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Hu2846, Dec. 10, 2003 (S. Kor.)
(denying patentability of a selection invention because it shared a common
medicinal purpose with the prior art).
26
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.) (“A patent
can be granted to a selective invention on the conditions that . . . subordinate
concepts possess effects different in quality from the preceding invention, or if
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standard for working effect when a claimed composition is
structurally similar to those shown in the prior art. Therefore, it is
extremely hard for an applicant or patentee to claim patentability
of an invention if the claimed composition is, for example, a
certain isomer (mirror image) or salt of a known chemical
compound.27
C. Disclosure Requirement
For the selection invention category, an invention is not
patentable unless the patent application explicitly discloses either
qualitative or quantitative working effects in its specification. 28
Explicitly stating such effects means either (1) the specification
must be specific as to the qualitative differences that any such
difference be verifiable, or (2) that the specification quantitatively
describes the invention’s working effect as to verify that such
effect is superior. 29 Merely stating that an invention is “very
excellent” compared to the preceding invention will not suffice.30
Further, such information must be more than stating the claimed
composition’s typical physical properties that are naturally
considered by a person having ordinary skill in the art. 31
not, at least, there exist conspicuous differences in effect as measured
quantitatively between them.”).
27
See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
28
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.) (“[T]he detailed description of the selective invention must explicitly state
the [qualitative or conspicuous quantitative] effects compared to the preceding
invention.”).
29
Id.
30
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2005Hu3338, Sept. 6, 2007 (S. Kor.).
31
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476 (consol.), Mar. 25,
2010 (S. Kor.) (holding that the application has failed to meet disclosure
requirement when it disclosed nothing “other than physical nature that an
ordinary technician naturally considers when he or she makes salt compounds of
medicinal substance.”).
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Subsequent cases seem to require that such difference be verifiable
to a person having ordinary skill in the art. 32 The applicant or
patentee needs not undergo any experiments verifying such
superior working effect; instead, explicitly disclosing such working
effect will suffice unless suspicions as to its superior working
effects are raised. 33 If there are suspicions as to the claimed
composition’s effects, the applicant or patentee can overcome them
by submitting specific comparative experimental data. 34 Such
comparative experimental data must relate to the claimed
composition’s intended medicinal purpose.35
III. PATENTABILITY STANDARD OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
While there are few Korean Supreme Court decisions regarding
selection invention,36 the Korean Supreme Court has addressed the
32

See generally Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct.
15, 2009 (S. Kor.).
33
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.) (“[I]t
is enough that the specifications of a selective invention state explicitly the
above mentioned kinds of effects compared to the preceding invention, and the
results of comparative experiments verifying conspicuousness of its effects in
concrete need not be stated.”).
34
See id. (“[I]f suspicions as to its effects are raised, an applicant for a
patent may allege and prove its effects after the date of patent application by
means of submitting specific comparative experimental data, etc.”).
35
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.) (stating that acute toxicity experiment is not relevant in proving
invention’s superior working effect since “it is just significant in examining
whether it can be used as a medicinal product.”).
36
Such cases include: Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2375, Dec. 26, 2002
(S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Hu1935, Oct. 24, 2003 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court
[S. Ct.], 2002Hu2846, Dec. 10, 2003 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2005Hu3338, Sept. 6, 2007 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 &
3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743
(consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar.
25, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S.
Kor.).
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issue at various times since 200237 and, most recently, in 201038.
A recurring discussion in the Korean Supreme Court’s holdings is
whether selection inventions are, in fact, patentable.
Several important trends have emerge from these decisions and
are worthy of note. First, the Korean Supreme Court has
historically invalidated patents on selection inventions and, until
recently, a patentee had never prevailed at the highest court. 39
Second, while the earliest case on this issue was a dispute between
individuals, the rest of the cases were disputes between nonKorean pharmaceutical companies and either the Korean
Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) or Korean pharmaceutical
companies.40 Third, the patentee or patent applicant against whom
the Korean Supreme Court has held was always a non-Korean
pharmaceutical company. In summary, a non-Korean
pharmaceutical company had never successfully defended a
selection invention at the Korean Supreme Court until one very
recent opinion.41 This section will discuss Sanofi-Aventis v. CJ et
al. (Sanofi)42 as it is the strictest and arguably most unreasonable
in terms of its patentability standard. This section will further
discuss the impact of Sanofi by analyzing Korean Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding selection invention thereafter.

37

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2375, Dec. 26, 2002 (S. Kor.).
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).
39
See id. (reversing and remanding the Korean Intellectual Property
Tribunal and Patent Court’s holding, which denied the invention’s
inventiveness).
40
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2375, Dec. 26, 2002 (S. Kor.).
41
For the First time, the Korean Supreme Court in 2010Hu3424 held in
favor of the non-Korean Company. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424,
Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).
42
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.).
38
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A. Sanofi Patent
The Korean Supreme Court’s consistent, strict application of
the novelty and inventiveness standards reflects the its hostility
against patentees and patent applicants. Such tendency peaked in
the Sanofi case, 43 in which the Korean Supreme Court set
extremely high novelty and inventiveness standards.44 This section
will provide a scientific background to the invention in Sanofi,
followed by a case summary and discussion of its significance.
1. Scientific Background
The issue in Sanofi was the patentability of an enantiomer
patent in light of the applicant’s prior patent directed towards a
racemate. This section will provide general understanding of
nomenclatures such as enantiomer and racemate, which are key
concepts to understand dispute in Sanofi.
i. Enantiomers and Racemates
The term chirality refers to a geometric property of an object
that is not identical to its mirror image, for example, a person’s
right and left hands. 45 When molecules are chiral, the same
chemical formula can describe molecules with different threedimensional structures. 46 Enantiomers are chiral molecules of
opposite orientation with only one point of chirality.47
Again, the concept of enantiomers, non-identical mirror
images, is illustrated by a person’s right and left hands. The right
and left hands are mirror images of each other, but they are not
43

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.

Kor.).
44

See Yang et al., supra note 23, at 1.
Jonathan McConathy & Michael J. Owens, Stereochemistry in Drug
Action, 5 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 70, 70 (2003).
46
See id.
47
Id.
45
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superimposable and thus not identical. Similarly, enantiomers are
identical in their chemical composition and structure in two
dimensional spaces, but are not superimposable as they are not
identical in their orientation in three dimensional spaces.48
A racemate is a mixture of those enantiomers, usually in equal
amounts.49 When an active ingredient of a drug is in the form of an
enantiomer, the drug is usually referred to as an enantiomer drug.
Vice versa, a racemate drug refers to a drug of which the active
ingredient is in the form of a racemate. Further, patents covering
enantiomer drugs are referred to as enantiomer patents, whereas a
racemate patent refers to a patent primarily covering a racemate
drug.
Although there is a high degree of structural similarity between
racemates and enantiomers, racemates and enantiomers may differ
greatly in a terms of biological and pharmaceutical properties. 50
Two enantiomers constituting a racemate may also differ
significantly in various respects51 because the active site of certain
enzymes may only react to one enantiomer and not the other,52
similar to how a right-handed glove does not fit on a person’s left
hand. Therefore, academic tendency is to view two enantiomers as
two separate properties unless proven otherwise. 53 Further, an

48

Id.
Id..
50
See id. at 71 (“In these cases, it is critical to distinguish the single
enantiomer from the racemic form because they may differ in their dosages,
efficacies, side effect profiles, or even indicated use.”).
51
Id. at 72 (“The 2 enantiomers of a chiral drug may differ significantly in
their bioavailability, rate of metabolism, metabolites, excretion, potency and
selectivity for receptors, transporters and/or enzymes, and toxicity.”).
52
See id. at 71.
53
Id.
49
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enantiomer’s pharmaceutical activity can be unpredictable absent
clinical trials and experiences.54
a. Pharmaceutical Practice
In the preparation of pharmaceuticals, laboratory synthesis of
chiral molecules initially results in racemate drugs. 55 Thus,
pharmaceutical companies must separate the enantiomers from one
another before investigating the pharmaceutical activities of the
enantiomer drugs. The problem is that separating the enantiomers
is usually difficult, 56 and pharmaceutical companies often spend
significant time and money on separation. 57 Therefore, evidence
that a company has successfully separated the enantiomers from
the racemate may facilitate patentability if the jurisdiction places
weight on the separation effort and process.
2. Procedural Background
i. History of Plavix®
In 1972, while seeking an agent that might have improved antiinflammatory properties, Sanofi-Aventis (Aventis) scientists
discovered that compounds known as thienopyridines have the
property of inhibiting blood platelet aggregation. 58 Thereafter,
54

See id. at 72 (“The decision to use a single enantiomer versus a mixture
of enantiomers of a particular drug should be made on the basis of the data from
clinical trials and clinical experience.”).
55
Jonathan J. Darrow, The Patentability of Enantiomers: Implications for
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 9 (2007).
56
See id. (“Due to the difficulty in separating the enantiomers from one
another, many chiral drugs were initially sold in racemic form.”).
57
For instance, Sanofi had given up commercial development of the
racemate PCR 4099, which “had been proceeding since 1980 and had reached
Phase I human trials at a cost stated to be tens of millions of dollars,” to develop
enantiomer of PCR 4099, which also took years. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex,
Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Therefore, a racemate patent usually
precedes an enantiomer patent.
58
Id. at 1078.
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Aventis scientists continuously put effort into finding chemical
modifications and derivatives of thienopyridines in order to
discover optimum anti-platelet aggregation properties with
minimal undesirable effects.59
Sanofi eventually selected a compound designated as PCR
4099 for commercial development.60 Further, Aventis found that a
hydrochloride salt of the compound was suitable for tableting PCR
4099.61 Aventis filed a patent application covering PCR 4099 as a
hydrochloride salt in a number of countries including the United
States and Korea. 62 However, as PCR 4099 still raised toxicity
issues, Aventis continued its research toward finding a more
optimum version of the agent.63
Aventis’s subsequent research focused on separating PCR
4099, which was a racemate mixture, into enantiomers, and
Aventis discovered that, after spending significant time and money
on separation, one of the enantiomers provided all of the favorable
antiplatelet activity without significant neurotoxicity. 64 Aventis
named that enantiomer “Clopidogrel.” 65 Aventis also found that
hydrochloride salt, which had been suitable for tableting the PCR
4099, was not suitable for Clopidogrel.66 Aventis’s research also
revealed that bisulfate was suitable for tableting Clopidogrel. 67
59

Id. at 1078-79.
Id. at 1079.
61
Id. at 1082.
62
Id.; Patent Court [Pat. Ct.], 2006Heo6303 & 8330, Jan. 18, 2008 (S.
Kor.).
63
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
64
Id. at 1081.
65
Id. at 1081-82 (“More years of development ensued for the
dextrorotatory enantiomer, to which Sanofi gave the common name
Clopidogrel.”).
66
Id. at 1082.
67
Id.
60
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Thereafter, Aventis filed a patent application covering Clopidogrel
as the bisulfate (Clopidogrel Bisulfate) in the United States and
Korea, as well as other countries. 68 Later, Aventis launched
Plavix®, which included Clopidogrel bisulfate as an active
ingredient.69
ii. Judicial History
KIPO granted Aventis a patent (the ’448 patent) 70 covering
PCR 4099 in 1983. Five years later, Aventis filed another patent
application71 covering Clopidogrel and its salt, and was granted a
patent (the ’969 patent).72 To summarize, the earlier ’448 patent is
a racemate patent while the subsequent ’969 patent is an
enantiomer patent.
As a result of the successful filing of the ’969 patent, other
pharmaceutical companies were prohibited from producing generic
products of Plavix® so long as either the ’448 or ’969 patent
survived.73 After 2003, the ’969 patent prevented other
68

Id.
Id. at 1077.
70
Kor. Patent No. 1,019,840,005,448 (filed Jul. 13, 1982); FAQ - Korea,
EUROPEAN
PATENT
OFFICE,
http://www.epo.org/searching/asian/korea/
faq.html#faq-406 (last updated Mar. 10, 2011) (Korean patents have a term of
protection of 20 years from the date of the filing).
71
Kor. Patent No. 1,019,880,009,969 (filed Feb. 17, 1987).
72
The ‘969 patent claimed Clopidogrel in its claim 1, and further claimed
Clopidogrel as the hydrochloride salt and hydrogen sulfite salt respectively in
claim 2 and 3. Therefore, the nature of the subject matter broadly presents two
issues before the Korean Supreme Court: first, whether an enantiomer of
chemical compound is patentable when the prior art discloses its racemate; and
second, whether the enantiomer as the specific salt is patentable when the prior
art disclose the racemate as the salt. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743
(consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S. Kor.).
73
See DONG-YUN KIM, KOREAN ECONOMICS, A DISPUTE BETWEEN
KOREAN
AND
FOREIGN
PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES,
http://
sgsg.hankyung.com/apps.frm/news.view?nkey=2562&c1=03&c2=06.
69
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pharmaceutical companies from producing generic versions of
Plavix®. 74 While generic versions of Plavix® would have been
prohibited until 2011, seventeen Korean pharmaceutical companies
sought to remove this barrier early by invalidating the ’969
patent. 75 The main argument was that the ’969 patent was
anticipated by the ’448 patent.76 The Korean Intellectual Property
Tribunal and Patent Court held the ’969 patent invalid, and Aventis
appealed the case to the Korean Supreme Court.77
iii. Holding
In Sanof, the Korean Supreme Court affirmed the Korean
Intellectual Property Tribunal and Patent Court’s holding, which
invalidated the ’969 patent by denying its novelty and
inventiveness. 78 With respect to claim 1 of the ’969 patent, the
Korean Supreme Court denied Clopidogrel’s novelty as anticipated
by the ’448 patent because the ’448 patent covered the
Clopidogrel.79 With respect to claim 2, the Korean Supreme Court
held that, because the ’448 patent discloses the Clopidogrel and
PCR 4099 as the hydrochloride salt, the Clopidogrel as the
hydrochloride salt is easily recognizable to a person having
ordinary skill in the art in a light of the ’448 patent.80
As to claim 3, the Korean Supreme Court compared the subject
matter’s pharmaceutical working effect with that of PCR4099 as
the hydrochloride salt, which was disclosed in the ’448 patent. The
Korean Supreme Court held that a two-fold pharmaceutical
74
75

See infra Part. V.B.1.ii.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.

Kor.).
76

See Yang et al., supra note 23, at 2.
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.).
78
See id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
77
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working effect of the invention compared to that of the prior art
was not superior since it was widely known that a certain
enantiomer may have greater working effect than that of a
racemate or another corresponding enantiomer.81
3. Significance
Sanofi is significant in two respects. First, it was the first
Korean Supreme Court case to determine the patentability of an
enantiomer patent. Second, it set an extremely high standard of
patentability for selection inventions. Opinions vary regarding
what makes Sanofi strict as to patentability. Some argue that it
heightened the novelty requirement. 82 Others argue, mistakenly,
that it denied the invention’s patentability for lack of written
description about quantitative differences, despite an actual
superior working effect.83 One may also argue that the decision is
strict because its literal impact is to deny patentability of a certain
composition merely because a degree of its working effect is wellknown.84
i. Heightened Novelty Standard
One may argue that the novelty standard set by Sanofi is much
stricter than that used in other leading patent jurisdictions.85 Such
an argument is well-supported by the fact that the current Korean
common law will likely invalidate an enantiomer patent if a prior
racemate patent mentions the existence of the subsequently
81

Id.
See generally Yang et al., supra note 23, at 2.
83
Id.
84
See generally Cha-Ho Jung & Hyeen Shin, Legal Review on Selection
Invention’s Novelty of Optical Isomer, 49 SEOUL NAT’L U. L. REV. 355 (2000).
85
See Yang et al., supra note 23, at 2 (“First, its novelty standard is much
stricter than those in other leading patent jurisdictions. Here, the Court held that
an enantiomer per se and its medicinal use lacks novelty over a prior art
racemate and its medicinal use – by comparison, the novelty of the enantiomer’s
medicinal use would be upheld in Japan.”).
82
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claimed enantiomers that comprise the racemate. 86 In contrast,
some countries have undergone deeper analysis, and sometimes
have upheld the novelty of an enantiomer patent regardless of the
raceamte patent’s mentioning of the enantiomers. For example,
some courts look at whether (1) the species of certain genus are so
characteristically (not structurally) similar that disclosure of a
genus in the prior art is necessarily a disclosure of every species,87
or (2) the method of separating a certain optical isomer from its
racemate is well-known or specifically disclosed.88 Korea instead
applied a per se analysis resulting in an extremely heightened
standard for selection invention novelty for enantiomer patents.
ii. Heightened Inventiveness Standard
One may also argue that Sanofi created a significantly
heightened inventiveness standard. Such an argument is supported
by the fact that the Korean Supreme Court held that a two-fold
superior working effect is not sufficient when such superior
working effect is obvious. 89 Therefore, one impact of Sanofi’s
holding is to require, at a minimum, a two-fold working effect for
the enantiomer drug to be “superior.”
iii. Lack of Description of Qualitative Difference
Some argue that the Sanofi decision is strict because the
Korean Supreme Court denied inventiveness of the patent for lack
of description as to quantitative differences in the specification
despite the invention’s actual superior working effects over the
86

See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.); see also infra Part. V.A.2.ii.
87
See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“It is well established that the disclosure of a genus in the prior art is not
necessarily a disclosure of every species that is a member of that genus.”).
88
See EPO Case T-0296/87 (Aug. 30, 1988), available at http://
www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t870296ep1.html.
89
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.); see also infra Part. IV.A.2.a.
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prior art.90 However, such an argument is flawed since a lack of
description as to quantitative difference was not an issue in the
case. Rather, the Korean Supreme Court stated that the invention’s
qualitative difference over the prior art was clearly described in the
specification. 91 Therefore, such arguments may have been made
due to confusion between quantitative and qualitative differences.
IV. POST-SANOFI DECISIONS
Sanofi was very influential in terms of legal impact. All three
subsequent Korean Supreme Court cases involving selection
invention cite Sanofi as binding precedent in reviewing the novelty
of an invention at issue.92 Two of those cases denied the novelty
pursuant to Sanofi.93 This section will discuss these two cases.94
A. Warner-Lambert Co. Patent
In 2008, the Korean Supreme Court dealt with another
selection invention patent case in which enantiomers of R-Trans

90

Yang et al., supra note 23, at 2.
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.) (stating that the pharmacological effects of anti-platelet aggregatory
and anti-thrombotic and the effect of acute toxicity experiment “are explicitly
stated in the detailed description of patent invention of this case.”).
92
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court
[S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).
93
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.)
(concerning a dispute between Warner-Lambert Co. and Korean pharmaceutical
companies as to an invalidation question); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520,
Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.) (concerning a dispute between Warner-Lambert Co. and
KIPO as to a patentability question).
94
2008Hu3469 & 3476 and 2008Hu3520 are based on the same facts
except that 2008Hu3469 & 3476 is an appeal against Korean pharmaceutical
companies, and 2008Hu3520 is an appeal against KIPO. Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
91
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and S-Trans heptanoic acid were claimed as patentable. 95 At the
same time, the prior art disclosed the racemate of R-Trans and STrans heptanoic acid.96 The Korean Supreme Court, citing Sanofi,
held that enantiomers of those heptanoic acids are recognizable
when the prior art discloses the racemate, and hence, the Korean
Supreme Court denied the novelty of those claimed invention. 97
The Korean Supreme Court further clarified that the method of
separating an enantiomer from its racemate is not relevant in
examining novelty requirements.98
B. Eli Lilly
The most recent Korean Supreme Court case regarding
selection invention is Eli Lilly from 2010. 99 Though the issue
before the Korean Supreme Court was not the patentability of an
enantiomer invention, one must note that Eli Lilly is the first
selection invention case in which the Korean Supreme Court did
not invalidate the patent at issue.100
V. WHY SO STRICT?
As discussed previously, the Korean Supreme Court has been
consistently hostile toward patentees, and such hostility peaked in
95

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
96
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.);
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3520, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
97
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu3469 & 3476, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
However, the Court does not specify the class to which the invention is
recognizable.
98
See id. (stating that even if the lower court erred in finding that the prior
art disclosed a method of separating an enantiomer from its racamate, such error
had no impact on the decision, because disclosing such a method is not
necessary in denying novelty of an invention at issue unless the subject matter of
an invention is of the separating method).
99
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor).
100
See infra Part IV.C.
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Sanofi as the Korean Supreme Court suggested strict patentability
standards of selection invention. 101 This section provides legal
analysis and persuasive policy justifications for such a strict
standard. This section will further discuss the significance of Eli
Lilly,102 which may be a signal for much changed attitude toward
non-Korean pharmaceutical companies in the future.
A. Legal Explanation
The Sanofi holding is strict in that it greatly heightened both
novelty and inventiveness standards. 103 This section will discuss
how such standards were legally heightened.
1. Heightened Novelty Standard
The Sanofi decision lacks a detailed inquiry, the presence of
which may have resulted in a different outcome. Pursuant to
Sanofi, structural similarity between a claimed composition and the
prior art is grounds for a per se denial of the composition’s
novelty.104 The most persuasive legal explanation for such per se
analysis of novelty standards is a lack of the Korean Supreme
Court’s judicial experience, which is especially true in the context
of intellectual property law.105 Such lack of judicial experience is
shown circumstantially from (1) the fact that the Korean Supreme
Court has sometimes misapplied inventiveness criterions to
novelty standards and (2) the Korean Supreme Court’s failure to

101

See supra Part III.A.
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).
103
See generally Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct.
15, 2009 (S. Kor.).
104
Id.
105
See Sang-Jo Jong, Contributory Patent Infringement in Korea, 2 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 287, 287 (2000) (“Partly due to a lack of experience, courts have
sometimes failed, in the course of interpreting provisions of the Patent Act, to
balance the interests of the patentee and the interests of the general public.”).
102
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distinguish scientific common knowledge and subject matter of an
invention.
i. Conceptual Misapplication
One may easily find that the Korean Supreme Court
conceptually misapplies inventiveness criterions to novelty
standards. Such conceptual misapplication occurs when the Korean
Supreme Court cites the perspective of a person having ordinary
skill in the art in judging novelty. 106 Generally speaking, such
conceptual misapplication heightened novelty standards by
blurring the line between novelty and inventiveness. 107 The
following discusses how the Korean Supreme Court conceptually
misapplied inventiveness criterions in Sanofi.
Article 29.1 of the Korean Patent Act defines novelty and
Article 29.2 defines inventiveness.108 As is the case in the United
States, 109 only Article 29.2 discusses a “person having ordinary
skill in the art” as a criterion for evaluating the inventiveness of an

106

See Jung & Shin, supra note 84, at 390 (stating that citing the
perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art is a conceptual
misapplication when judging the novelty standard).
107
See generally id. at 390.
108
See Erstling, supra note 9, at 451 (“The basis for the requirement of an
‘inventive step’ is found in Article 29.2 of the Korean Patent Act, which
provides that no patent for an invention may be granted if the invention could
easily have been made before the filing of a patent application by a person with
ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31,
1961, art. 29 (S. Kor.).
109
See 3 CARL R. MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9:1 (4th ed. 2013)
(footnote omitted) (“[35 U.S.C. § 103(a)] states that an invention is not
patentable if it would have been ‘obvious’ over the ‘prior art’ at the time the
invention was made. Obviousness is to be judged from the objective perspective
of ‘a person having ordinary skill in the art’ to which the invention pertains.”).
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invention. 110 Therefore, using such a person’s perspective in
judging the novelty of an invention itself is a conceptual
misapplication of the law.111
In Sanofi, the Korean Supreme Court committed this
conceptual misapplication. As to Clopidogrel as the hydrochloride
salt, Sanofi denied its novelty by reasoning that the presence of the
invention is easily recognizable to a person having ordinary skill in
the art from the prior art disclosing Clopidogrel and racemate as
the hydrochloride salt.112 Regardless of whether the invention was
recognizable to such a person, Sanofi uses the perspective of a
person having ordinary skill in the art in denying novelty of the
invention. 113 Erroneously, under the Korean Supreme Court’s
reasoning, even though an invention at issue is not of the same
invention disclosed in the prior art, the invention is anticipated for
lack of novelty if the presence of the invention is recognizable to a
person having ordinary skill in the art.
a. Lack of Distinction between Scientific Common
Knowledge and Subject Matter of an Invention
In denying novelty of the invention, Sanofi cited the racemate
patent disclosing PCR4099 and its enantiomers (Clopidogrel),
which are the subject matter of the ’969 patent.114 Therefore, the
Korean Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the racemate

110

See Jung & Shin, supra note 84, at 391 (stating that while Korean Patent
Act article 29.1 defines novelty and 29.2 defines inventiveness, the words “a
person having ordinary skill in the art,” are only stated in 29.2).
111
See Jung & Shin, supra note 84, at 390 (stating that citing a perspective
of a person having ordinary skill in the art is a conceptual misapplication in
judging novelty standard).
112
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.).
113
Id.
114
Id.
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patent was not only PCR 4099, but also Clopidogrel.115 However,
the prior art neither stated that such enantiomers were substantially
separated nor provided a clear motivation to indicate the
enantiomers as its subject matter. 116 Regardless, the Korean
Supreme Court held that prior art disclosed the Clopidogrel
because it was scientifically common knowledge. Thus, Sanofi’s
holding makes a prior art patent an anticipating reference even
when the subject matter of the claimed invention has not been
enabled by the prior art.
Perceiving scientific common knowledge as the subject matter
of an invention may be problematic. Though it is widely known
that one of an enantiomer separated from its racemate may have
greater pharmaceutical effect than that of its racemate, a lot of
products are not available in the form of an enantiomer, since
separating the enantiomer from its racemate is a very difficult
process on which pharmaceutical companies usually spend
considerable time and money.117 As such, the United States, along
with Europe and Japan, have held that “knowledge that
enantiomers may be separated is not anticipation of a specific
enantiomer that has not been separated, identified, and
characterized.”118
115

Id. (“[E]ach enantiomer stated in the comparison invention No. 1 refers
to dextro enantiomer and levo enantiomer and their mixture refers to racemate,
so all of them, i.e., dextro enantiomer, levo enantiomer, and racemate, are the
objects of invention of the comparison invention No. 1.”).
116
See Patent Court [Pat. Ct.], 2006Heo6303 & 8330, Jan. 18, 2008 (S.
Kor.).
117
See Jung & Shin, supra note 84, at 392 (stating that the fact that Aventis
invested a significant amount of money and time in developing a method of
separating enantiomers from its racemate evidences that enantiomers are not
easily separable from its racemate); see also Darrow, supra note 55, at 9 (“Due
to the difficulty in separating the enantiomers from one another, many chiral
drugs were initially sold in racemic form.”).
118
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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Despite the significant process of separating an enantiomer
from its racemate, the Korean Supreme Court held in Sanofi that
anticipating an enantiomer patent does not require disclosure of the
process in the prior art.119 However, the patent was directed to the
chemical structure itself, whereas if the patent had included a claim
to the method of separation it may have been patentable.
In conclusion, while other leading jurisdictions require further
analysis on top of the mere presence of enantiomers,120 the Korean
Supreme Court’s oversimplified holding in Sanofi substantially
heightened the novelty standards by stating that scientific
knowledge of the presence of an enantiomer in a racemate mixture
anticipates a patent claiming an isolated enantiomer.
2. Heightened Inventiveness Standard
In examining whether the drug’s working effect is superior
over the prior art, Sanofi further required that the working effect
not be derived from routine experimentation, regardless of drug
toxicity. 121 The possible legal explanation for a heightened
inventiveness standard is relatively more obscure and complex
than that of a novelty standard. However, one may find a reason
119

See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009
(S. Kor.). Interestingly, the lower court held that mentioning the enantiomer
itself is merely stating scientifically common knowledge unless the prior art
discloses the separating method specifically. Accordingly, the lower court held
that merely disclosing scientifically common knowledge itself does not deny
novelty of the invention. See Patent Court [Pat. Ct.], 2006Heo6303 & 8330, Jan.
18, 2008 (S. Kor.) (holding that disclosing enantiomers without (1) the method
of separating those enantiomers from its racemate, (2) any experiment
performing such separation, or (3) any motivation specifying enantiomers as
subject matter is merely stating common scientific knowledge that racemate may
exist in a form of one of enantiomer).
120
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
121
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.).
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for heightened inventiveness in unclear inventiveness criterions
and misunderstanding of the nature of Article 29.2.
i. Predictability
Sanofi held that the working effect of the invention is obvious,
and hence, inventiveness must be denied.122 Therefore, pursuant to
Sanofi, superior working effect must not only be quantitatively
superior, but also unpredictable. Sanofi seems to deal with the
predictability very broadly. What the Korean Supreme Court found
is not that an enantiomer drug always has a superior working effect
over racemate drugs, but rather, that one of the enantiomer
separated from the racemate may have superior working effect
(superior enantiomer) over the other enantiomer (inferior
enantiomer).123 Therefore, Sanofi concludes that it is obvious that
an enantiomer drug consisting of superior enantiomers has, at least,
a two-fold working effect over the racemate drug since superior
enantiomers replace inferior enantiomers.124
The predictability within the context of the Sanofi’s holding
departs from one scientific possibility–that one enantiomer may be
superior over the other, not that one enantiomer will likely be
superior over the other. Therefore, Sanofi’s conception of the
predictability is a very low threshold.
ii. Toxicity
In Sanofi, the Korean Supreme Court declined to consider
toxicity of the enantiomer drugs as part of the predictability
analysis.125 Rather, the Korean Supreme Court considered toxicity
separated from a drug’s beneficial activity, and stated that the
122

Id.
Id.
124
Id.
125
See id. (holding that a drug’s toxicity will not be considered as a part of
the inventiveness).
123
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invention’s toxicity is only relevant in examining whether the
invention can be used as medicinal product.126
The Korean Supreme Court’s non-consideration of the toxicity
for predictability heightened the inventiveness criteria as well. In
Apotex, 127 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit dealt with same issue as was before the Korean
Supreme Court in Sanofi, experts for both sides agreed that
Clopidogrel’s degree and kind of stereoselectivity 128 was
unpredictable since “activity and toxicity were more likely to be
positively correlated, such that a reduction in toxicity would be
expected also to reduce the beneficial activity.” 129 Therefore,
consideration of toxicity as a part of predictability would have
brought a different result regarding inventiveness. Still, in Sanofi,
the Korean Supreme Court considered the drug’s beneficial
activity only and asked whether such activity was predictable or
not regardless the drug’s toxicity.130

126

A drug is patentable under selection invention unless its toxicity exceeds
the minimum threshold set by the court. See Patent Court [Pat. Ct.],
2006Heo6303 & 8330, Jan. 18, 2008 (S. Kor.) (“[Toxicity] is just significant in
examining whether it can be used as a medicinal product.”).
127
See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
128
Id. at 1081 (Clopidogrel “provided all of the favorable antiplatelet
activity but with no siginificant neurotoxicity, while the other enantiomer
produced no antiplatelet activity but virtually all of the neurotoxicity.”).
129
See id. at 1087.
130
Therefore, Sanofi’s test may not treat the following inventions
differently: one invention that is highly superior in beneficial activity with high
toxicity, and the other invention that is highly superior in beneficial activity with
almost no toxicity. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct.
15, 2009 (S. Kor.).
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iii. Inventiveness Criterion
The Sanofi decision does not specify a class of persons to
whom such working effect may be obvious. 131 While one may
infer from Article 29.2 that such a class may be persons having
ordinary skill in the art, even assuming such is problematic since
the Korean Supreme Court seems to misunderstand the nature of
Article 29.2.132
Inventiveness of selection invention derives from Article 29.2,
which denies inventiveness when a person having ordinary skill in
the art could easily have made the invention.133 Therefore, literal
application of Article 29.2 to selection invention will not always
deny inventiveness of an enantiomer patent by the prior art, which
discloses the enantiomer’s racemate, since the fact that the
enantiomer drug’s working effect is obvious or predictable does
not necessarily indicate that the enantiomer drug could have been
easily made.134 However, rather than asking whether the invention
could have easily been made, the Korean Supreme Court asks
whether the working effect is “obvious or well-known” to a person
having ordinary skill in the art.135

131

See generally id.
See Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 29.2
(S. Kor.) (“[A]n invention could easily have been made before the filing of a
patent application by a person ordinarily skilled in the art to which the invention
pertains, the patent for such an invention may not be granted.”).
133
See id.
134
It is general knowledge that one enantiomer may behave differently than
another. See Darrow, supra note 55, at 8. However, such knowledge will not
enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice an enantiomer drug
since one must separate enantiomers first, and the separation is difficult process.
Id. at 9.
135
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Hu736 & 743 (consol.), Oct. 15, 2009 (S.
Kor.).
132
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B. Protectionism?
Though patentability of selection invention may be legally
unreasonable, interestingly, such legally unreasonable standards
serve the primary rationale of Korean Patent Act.136 This section
provides possible explanation of the strict standard of selection
invention in a term of policy justification by finding a causal
connection between the strict standard and its impact on Korea’s
pharmaceutical industry and its public. This section will first
discuss the primary rationales of the Korean Patent Act, and then
discuss how strict patentability standards of selection invention
serve those rationales well.
1. Rationales of the Korean Patent Act
Narrowly, the rationale of the Korean Patent Act is to
“contribute to the development of industry” by protecting and
utilizing invention. 137 Broadly, the Korean Patent Act tries to
further the public’s interest. 138 Therefore, the rationales of the
Korean Patent Act are well-defined as dual in nature such that an
invention that may undermine the industrial development or public
interest is not patentable.139 Such dual nature of the Korean patent

136

Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 1 (S. Kor.)
(stating in Article 1 that the “purpose of the [Korean Patent Act] is to encourage,
protect and utilize inventions, thereby improving and developing technology,
and to contribute to the development of industry.”).
137
See Erstling, supra note 9, at 448 (“[The Korean Patent Act] seeks both
to protect and encourage inventions while at the same time promoting industrial
development.”); see also Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31,
1961, art. 1 (S. Kor.).
138
See Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 32 (S.
Kor.) (“An invention likely to contravene public order or morality or to injure
public health may not be patented.”).
139
See KOREAN INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
KOREAN PATENT ACT 3 (2007) (stating that an invention is not patentable if
providing protection over the invention undermines industrial development or
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system overrides an inventor’s patent rights so that giving
incentives to patentees is deemed incidental in achieving the
primary rationales.140 The fact that inventors’ rights are limited and
open to governmental interference circumstantially supports this
notion.141
i. Impacts of the Korean Supreme Court’s Decision on
Korean Pharmaceutical Industry
The Korean Supreme Court’s consistent hostility toward
patentees and applicants via strict novelty and inventiveness
standards has several economic and social impacts, which perfectly
serve the primary rationales of the Korean Patent Act. 142 Those
impacts include (1) to confer economic benefits and
competitiveness to Korea’s domestic pharmaceutical industry via

public interest as the Korean Patent Act intends to achieve both individual and
public interest).
140
Article 1 does not mention rights of inventors. Rather, it mentions
“protecting invention” through which, the Article 1 states, industrial
development will be encouraged. See Teukheo beob [Patent Act], Act. No. 950,
Dec. 31, 1961, art. 1 (S. Kor.).
141
Compared to that of the United States, an inventor’s rights under the
Korean Patent Act are more limited and open to governmental interference. For
instance, a patentee has an obligation to work the patented invention. See
KOREAN INTELL. PROPERTY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 5 (stating that a
patentee’s right over an invention may be interfered with if the patentee does not
work or insufficiently works the invention pursuant to Korean Patent Act article
107 or 116); see also Erstling, supra note 9, at 458 (discussion of the exceptions
through which patentee’s exclusive right may be interfered and third party’s
non-exclusive license to work a patented invention in a limited circumstances).
Further, the fact that patent rights are freely assignable circumstantially supports
the fact that inventors’ rights under Korean patent law are of less importance
than that of the United States. See Erstling, supra note 9, at 453 (“Korea
achieves an open marketplace under its patent law by providing that patents and
their associated rights are freely assignable and otherwise transferable.”).
142
See infra Parts III.A, IV.
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the preventing evergreening 143 strategy of non-Korean
pharmaceutical industry, and (2) to lower drug prices so that the
public may easily access the drug over which non-Korean
pharmaceutical companies failed to gain or maintain patent rights.
ii. Industrial Development
Strict novelty and inventiveness standards of selection
invention effectively prevent pharmaceutical companies’
evergreening strategies. This section explains why hostility toward
evergreening strategies inevitably leads to substantial benefits to
Korean pharmaceutical companies. Generally speaking, there
exists a strong causal connection between the Korean Supreme
Court’s hostility toward patentees and applicants and the Korean
Patent Act’s primary rationale of industrial development.
The idea that pharmaceutical products can be patentable is
recent to the Korean Patent Act. Pharmaceutical products
themselves were not patentable subject matter pursuant to Article
32 until 1986, 144 primarily because the Korean pharmaceutical
industry was not competitive enough to survive due to the leading
pharmaceutical companies’ monopoly over the products.145 During
the period when patent protection over pharmaceutical products

143

See Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific
Equivalence: Reconciling Patent Law's Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA's
Bioequivalence Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 59, 104-05 (2013)
(“Evergreening . . . occurs when a pharmaceutical company that has lost both
FDA exclusivity and patent protection on the active ingredient of its drug seeks
to extend its monopoly by protecting the drug with a series of peripheral patents
that allow for additional FDA exclusivity and further patent protection.”).
144
See Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 118, 120 (1994).
145
Sang-Youn Hwang, A Prospect and Development Direction of Korean
Pharmaceutical Industry, SHINYOUNG SECURITIES RESEARCH CENTER, 2000, at
26.
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was limited,146 Korean pharmaceutical companies learned how to
manufacture finished drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients
(API),147 which became their major source of revenue.148
Such protection over domestic pharmaceutical industries ended
in 1986 due to bilateral trade negotiations. 149 The United States
asked Korea for stronger protection over pharmaceutical products,
and Korea amended the Korean Patent Act to provide patent
protection over chemical substances. 150 Such protection was also
conferred over pharmaceutical products per se.151
Yet, one must note that the primary rationales of the Korean
Patent Act were not the driving forces to such amendment. While
the Korean Patent Act pursues industrial development and public
interest, such an amendment was a result of recognizing a need for
146

See Song & Kim, supra note 143, at 122 (“Since then the Patent Act has
been revised several times, but protection for inventions of chemical substances
per se was not allowed until 1987. Until then, only process patents were
available for chemical inventions.”).
147
World Health Organization, Definition of Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredient, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/
quality_safety/quality_assurance/DefinitionAPI-QAS11-426Rev1-08082011.pdf
(“Any substance or combination of substances used in a finished pharmaceutical
product (FPP), intended to furnish pharmacological activity or to otherwise have
direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
disease, or to have direct effect in restoring, correcting or modifying
physiological functions in human beings.”).
148
Hwang, supra note 144, at 26.
149
See KOREAN INTELL. PROPERTY OFFICE, supra note 138 at 206 (“As a
result of bilateral agreement between Korea and United States, Korean Patent
Act modified so that invention of pharmaceutical products, method of making
the products, and pharmaceutical purpose become patentable.”).
150
See Song & Kim, supra note 144, at 121-22.
151
See id. at 122 (“As a result of the Korea-US trade negotiations in 1986,
the Patent Act was amended to allow patent protection for chemical substances,
pharmaceuticals, and agrochemicals. The patent term was also extended from
twelve years to fifteen years. The amended Patent Act became effective July 1,
1987.”).
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foreign investment.152 Stated another way, Korea started providing
patent protection over pharmaceuticals when Korean
pharmaceutical companies were still not competitive against nonKorean pharmaceutical companies. Because of this lack of
competitiveness in the Korean pharmaceutical industry, the
industry started investing in Research and Development on me-too
drugs (also known as generic drugs),153 which have relatively low
barriers to entry compared to other pharmaceuticals.154
Therefore, the fact that selling generic drugs is a major source
of profit for Korean pharmaceutical industries justifies the Korean
Supreme Court’s willingness to donate inventions–once claimed to
be selection inventions–to the public by invalidating or rejecting
patentability of the invention, thereby leaving the invention
available to all pharmaceutical companies.
iii. Public Interest
The Korean Supreme Court’s hostility toward patentees and
applicants of selection inventions also confers some public interest
by minimizing the social cost of patenting. The likelihood of
invalidation or rejection of selection invention patents will
encourage other pharmaceutical companies to manufacture generic

152

See id. at 120 (“Realizing that foreigners will not invest in high-tech
industries without adequate protection of their technologies, Korea reached a
consensus on the positive role of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) in
economic development.”).
153
Definition of Me-too drug, MEDICIENNET.COM (June 14, 2012), http://
www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=33748 (defining me-too
drug as “a drug that is structurally very similar to already known drugs, with
only minor differences.”).
154
Hwang, supra note 144, at 26 (stating that Korean pharmaceutical
companies in the 1980s used a strategy of developing generic drugs, which had a
relatively low entry barrier, since Korean pharmaceutical companies had not had
competitive development capacity of the products).
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products of the rejected or invalidated invention.155 Such hostility
toward monopoly will likely lower the drug price to which the
invention pertains,156 and give the public alternative versions of the
invention. 157 This public interest will be served the most where
pharmaceutical industry, like the Korean pharmaceutical industry,
has “strong portfolio of generic products rather than expensive,
branded drugs.”158
iv. Turning Point?
Out of the Korean Supreme Court cases involving selection
invention, only one case, Eli Lilly, declined to invalidate a
patent. 159 There, Hanmi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., a Korean
company, brought a defensive action against Eli Lilly & Co.,
seeking to invalidate a patent. The patent at issue had more than
one kind of quantitative and qualitative working effects. Therefore,
the issue before the Korean Supreme Court was whether all of such
working effects must be different than or superior to the prior art in
order to possess inventiveness.160 In reversing and remanding the
case to the Korean Intellectual Property Tribunal and Patent Court,
the Korean Supreme Court declined to invalidate the patent by
holding that inventiveness will be found even when only part of

155

See Beom-Su Shin, Invalidation of Plavix Enabling Generic Products,
DOCTOR’S NEWS (Jan. 18, 2008, 3:33 PM), http://www.doctorsnews.co.kr/news/
articleView.html?idxno=44797 (interviewing one of respondent of the Sanofi
Patent, who stated that the company will continue produce generic products of
Plavix).
156
See 1 CARL R. MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:32 (4th ed. 2013).
157
See id. at § 1:33.
158
GBI Research, South Korea Pharmaceutical Market Outlook 2013,
RESEARCH AND MARKETS (May 2013), http://www.researchandmarkets.com/
research/7d5t8r/south_korea.
159
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).
160
Id.
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those working effects are quantitatively different than or superior
to that of the prior art.161
It is significant that patentees of selection inventions at issues
before the Korean Supreme Court had always been non-Korean
pharmaceutical companies. The Korean Supreme Court, for the
first time, declined to invalidate a non-Korean company’s patent of
selection invention. Hence, one may argue that Eli Lilly is a
turning point of the Korean Supreme Court’s trends that have
unwaveringly favored its domestic pharmaceutical companies, and
possibly signaling more favorable outcomes toward non-Korean
pharmaceutical companies. The reasoning supporting this
argument is two-fold.
First, Eli Lilly lowered the selection invention’s patentability
standard for the first time. Eli Lilly is not the first case dealing with
an issue of multiple working effects. The Korean Supreme Court
faced the same issue in 2001Hu2740 (Pfizer). However, the
Korean Supreme Court’s holding in Pfizer was contrary to that in
Eli Lilly.162
In turn, The Korean Supreme Court had to overrule its holding
in Pfizer. This is significant because Eli Lilly is the first case that
actually lowered patentability standards, in favor of a patentee by
overruling its prior decision.163
Second, Eli Lilly seems to recognize this dispute as one
between a foreign company and a domestic company, rather than
one between a patentee and an alleged infringer. Such a view is
161

See Id.
See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Hu2740, Apr. 25, 2003 (S. Kor.)
(holding that all working effects of claimed selection invention must possess
superior working effects over the prior art).
163
See Won-Joon Kim, The Inventive Step Decision when Partial
Components of the Selection Invention have Noticeable Effects, 17 INFORMEDIA
L. 1, 26 (2013).
162
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implicitly indicated by the language of Eli Lilly. The Korean
Supreme Court, when writing its opinions, always discloses the
“main issues” by its own language. The Korean Supreme Court
briefly gives readers an idea as to (1) the issues, (2) what will be
discussed, and (3) a brief holding of the case. Generally speaking,
the “main issues” section functions as a self-characterization of the
opinion.
Interestingly, Eli Lilly stated, in its “main issues,” that the
opinion reversed the lower court’s holding, which denied
inventiveness of patented selection invention, when the dispute
was brought by a company against “foreign company.” 164
Therefore, the language identifying a patentee as a “foreign
company” may indicate that the Korean Supreme Court mitigated
the selection invention’s patentability standard as a response to its
hostile decisions toward foreign non-Korean pharmaceutical
companies. The fact that identifying a patentee as a “foreign
company,” limited to the cases regarding selection invention, has
never been used before by the Korean Supreme Court further
supports this position.
VI. CONCLUSION
Korean jurisdiction has been extremely strict against patentees
of selection invention. Such hostility was especially true when an
invention is either (1) structurally similar, or (2) only different in
orientation to that of a prior art. Unless Sanofi is overturned, U.S.
pharmaceutical companies will rarely succeed in seeking patent
protection over those inventions and therefore, the evergreening
strategy will likely fail as well. Though the Eli Lilly case favored a
U.S. pharmaceutical company, in the future, one cannot rest easy
by relying on only one case. More Korean Supreme Court
decisions will help predicting future invalidation trends regarding
the patentability of selection inventions.
164

See 2 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Hu3424, Nov. 5, 2010 (S. Kor.).

